Some things you need to know about Mary Shelleys Frankenstein Essay Example for Free

Some things you need to know about Mary Shelleys Frankenstein Essay In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, the definition of the monstrous is both entirely obvious and entirely ambiguous. Frankenstein’s creation, often dubbed ‘Frankenstein’s monster,’ is at once both innocent and murderous; corrupted and corrupting. The discrepancy between the different aspects of his nature can be read in the very definition of the word monster as it has developed over time. The definition of ‘monster’ is â€Å"Originally: a mythical creature which is part animal and part human, or combines elements of two or more animal forms and is frequently of great size and ferocious appearance. Later, more generally: an imaginary creature that is large, ugly, and frightening† (OED). This definition is particularly apt in studying the monstrous in Frankenstein, as it demonstrates the extent to which the creature labeled a ‘monster’ is construed to be something morally and physically disturbing because of its combination of elements from numerous animal forms. Being â€Å"of great size and ferocious appearance† alone would not constitute cause for moral connotations about the creature, and yet the present monstrosity also encompasses fear. It is this fear that ultimately makes the creature a monster, rather than his appearance or any innate moral compass. This essay will seek to demonstrate how Frankenstein’s creature is used to explore morality through his creation and animation, his namelessness, loneliness, and death. Finally, it will examine possible connections between Shelley’s characterization of Frankenstein and the creature, as the two are inextricably linked—not only by their relationship as creator and created, but also according to their logic, their desires, and the consequences of each of their choices throughout the novel. Firstly, the way in which Frankenstein assembles his creature is a substantial and significant part of the novel and should be closely examined. Frankenstein’s own life is put entirely on hold while he obsesses over the dark and mysterious discovery that he has made. After he makes his discovery about the creation of life, Frankenstein says, â€Å"Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret toil as I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave or tortured the living animal to animate lifeless clay?† (Shelley, 46). The phrase, â€Å"the horrors of my secret toil† heavily emphasizes Frankenstein’s isolation and obsession, as he put himself under such immense stress with the scientific project that he frequently became ill. The secrecy of his project also shows how he cut himself off from his family and friends, not even writing home or attempting any social activity or life outside of his own study. In this, he loses sight of humanity, and as such he loses sight of beauty. This results in the utterly fragmented identity of his creation. At the moment of its animation, Frankenstein says, â€Å"How can I†¦ delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavored to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God† (60). Despite Victor’s greatest efforts to create something beautiful, it is clear that he focused too much on the task at hand, and upon each individual part of his appearance, rather than on the holistic nature of his creation. Victor has essentially focused more on the scientific side of his creation than upon his responsibility, as its creator, to also endow a sense of humanity. The creature is not only comprised of corpses, but of animal parts, and while he has taken care to ensure that â€Å"His limbs were in proportion,† he has entirely ignored the importance of the body as a whole, which is made up of parts that do not match. As such, he has created a monster. This foreshadows the way in which Victor, by focusing solely on the scientific endeavor and not its results, essentially causes the creature to become the monster that he perceives it to be. This will be further discussed with regards to the effects of loneliness on both Frankenstein and his creature. Another important aspect of the Frankenstein’s act of creation is that it encompasses both birth and death in one terrifying spectacle. As Frankenstein has not been able to manufacture a body himself, he has instead relied wholly on taking various body parts from both animal and human corpses in order to piece a body together. This means that while the body is comprised of the dead, it is also the birthplace of new life. The irony of this is not lost upon the narrating Frankenstein, seen in the previous quote: â€Å"I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave or tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay† (46). The culmination of both death and life in this strange creature is another aspect of its fragmented identity. Throughout Shelley’s Frankenstein, Frankenstein’s so-called monster is given a slew of insulting and hateful names. These are given to him by the villagers who chase him away, and more notably, by Frankenstein himself. The creature is never ascribed a name, instead being referred to as â€Å"creature,† â€Å"fiend,† â€Å"spectre,† â€Å"demon,† â€Å"wretch,† â€Å"devil,† â€Å"thing,† â€Å"being,† and â€Å"ogre† (Baldick). The lack of a name given to the creature does not only demonstrate that Frankenstein does not consider him human, though much criticism offers perspectives on this. It is true that it shows the dehumanization of the creature by its creator, but this also forces any critics or readers to similarly dehumanize the creature in discussion of him. By denying him a name, it is impossible for any essay or discussion to fully embrace the human and highly intelligent aspects granted to the crea ture. The repetition of these abstract and possibly overreaching terms emphasizes a lack of identity that is by no means manifest in Shelley’s characterization of the creature. The creature has a distinct personality and development arc throughout the novel, and yet is never referred to inhuman or personal terms. This informs much of the reader’s perspective of the creature, both inciting sympathy and becoming an obstacle to relation to it. Names such as these, especially those such as â€Å"devil,† also have broad moral connotations. While the creature may be truly â€Å"monstrous† in appearance, being comprised of so many and such various parts, large and apparently frightening, nothing of his character or morality can be derived before Frankenstein has already effectively dubbed him as evil. This heavy emphasis on appearances as contributory to perceived morality acts in stark contrast to the way in which Elizabeth’s character is first introduced. Victor’s parents adopt Elizabeth entirely because she is physically beautiful. Frankenstein narrates, â€Å"They consulted their village priest, and the result was that Elizabeth Lavenza became the inmate of my parents’ house—my more than sister—the beautiful and adored companion of all my occupations and my pleasures† (4). Frankenstein also comments that â€Å"Everyone loved Elizabeth† (5). In this way, appearance and perceived character are inextricably linked, and while this works in Elizabeth’s favor, in the case of Frankenstein’s creation it means that he is instantly perceived to be inherently evil because of his outward appearance. While horrific, this appearance is the fault of Frankenstein himself and reflects more on his own ideas of beauty and the necessi ty of scientific progress than it reflects on the genuine character of the creature himself. It is only through this presentation of his character that the creature is perceived to be, and eventually becomes a monster in the later sense of being â€Å"large, ugly, and terrifying† (OED), as he could otherwise have been simply defined in terms of size and the variety of his body parts. These, as well as other factors, ultimately contribute to the corruption of Frankenstein’s monster. While many critics suggest that his immorality may indeed have been somehow innate, it is far more convincing to study Shelley’s Frankenstein as a presentation of how nurture is more important to the development of character that nature. The creature is first abandoned at birth, then chased away by the only people he comes into any kind of contact with—people he comes to trust, and, in a way, love—and finally denied the chance at companionship. He is ultimately alone, the only creature of his kind in existence, and hated and feared by all humanity. While Frankenstein understandably did not have the power to alter the opinions and perceptions of others, he nonetheless had ample opportunity in which to take responsibility for his creation and to teach it morality and show it companionship and love. It is only when these opportunities are repeatedly forsaken th an the creature becomes, morally speaking, a monster. The creature himself argues this point, pointing out, â€Å"No mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses,† and saying to Victor, â€Å"I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam but I am rather the fallen angel†¦ I was benevolent and good, misery made me a friend†¦ what hope can I gather from your fellow creature†¦ they spurn and hate me† (78). Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the creature’s character that is being highlighted here is that he is so completely aware of what he lacks, and how he is different. He is aware that he lacked a mother, who may well have provided his education, unconditional love, and companionship. Similarly, he has read Paradise Lost, which provides a detailed analysis of what it means to be loved by one’s creator and be given a companion. God loves Adam despite his sin and provides him with Eve as a wife and partner, which are both denied him by his own cr eator, Frankenstein. The creature’s initial abandonment by Frankenstein is shortly afterward followed by his rejection from the family he learns to love. After the creature leaves Frankenstein’s apartments, he wanders in the woods until he eventually comes across a family upon whom he can spy and learn from. From these people, he learns not only how to communicate, but how to relate to other people. With them, he begins to form some semblance of a life of routine and safety: he is safely hidden and knows that he is in no danger and able to provide for himself, and works out a life for himself around the family’s routine. By watching them, the creature eventually begins to feel as though he is a part of this family. He also begins to feel this because he has been long providing for them, leaving them firewood that he collects in order to show his gratitude for being able to share in their life and home, even if they are not aware of his presence. It is precisely because of this connec tion that the monster feels so utterly betrayed by their rejection. His response to the rejection of this family is initially to rail at Frankenstein, saying, â€Å"Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? Why, in that instant, did I not extinguish the spark of existence which you had so wantonly bestowed?† (176). This quotation shows that the creature has a conscience, and is able to regret his actions. He blames Frankenstein for creating him, as well as for abandoning him, and the fact that he describes the act of creation as â€Å"wanton† shows that he does not believe it was a just or wholesome use of science. Continuing to reflect on the rejection that he faced at the hands of this family, the monster then recalls, â€Å"I continued for the remainder of the day in my hovel in a state of utter and stupid despair. My protectors had departed and had broken the only link that held me to the world. For the first time, the feelings of revenge and hatred filled my bosom† (178). The creature’s utter despondency shows his deep emotional connection to the family. In a sense, because he was never raised by a parent or creator, the family had become like a parental, guiding figure to him, showing how to coexist with others and how to live in a way that Frankenstein had so completely neglected. This is highlighted by his calling them â€Å"protectors,† as this word implies an active role of protection. However, the family had not even been aware of the monster’s existence while acting as his protectors, and this shows both the extent of the creature’s desperation for companionship and the pain of rejection by those he hoped would continue to protect him. This is a milestone moment in the development of the monster as a truly monstrous character, as his appearance frightens the family and villagers to the extent that they chase him away. They believe him to be dangerous, and therefore morally corrupt, despite the fact that he is, in reality, extremely young and impressionable. Their fear of him inspires the creature to become something he can be sure of a monster. â€Å"This then was the reward of my benevolence! †¦The feelings of kindness and gentleness which I had entertained but a few moments before gave place to hellish rage and gnashing of teeth. Inflamed by pain, I vowed eternal hatred and vengeance to all mankind† (179). This passage shows the final transition of the creature from innocent, desperate new-born, to a dejected creature seeking to cause pain and enact revenge. However, this transition was not necessarily permanent, as the creature still asks for the chance to begin anew, and offers to show mercy and bec ome benevolent once more, should Frankenstein create for him a companion. The creature proposes that Frankenstein embark on this new project of creation, saying, â€Å"If any being felt emotions of benevolence towards me, I should return them a hundred-fold†¦ I would make peace with the whole kind† (119). This shows that just as the creature has been willing to punish all of humanity for the crimes of his creator, he would also be willing to forgive â€Å"the whole kind† if one human were to show him kindness—even if only under extreme duress. Despite the crimes and wrongdoings of Frankenstein’s monster, it is very problematic to characterize him simply as a monster in the moral sense. While his aspect is clearly repulsive, his physical manifestation is by no means reflective of personality, until he is treated as though it must be. Indeed, Lancaster observes that â€Å"Frankenstein’s Monster represents a less threatening version of the social outsider†¦ because the Monster’s identity disconnects him from humanity† (133-34). This suggests a total reversal of conventional depictions of monstrosity, as the creature is presented as a sympathetic character, rather than as inherently evil. Works Cited Baldick, Chris. In Frankenstein’s shadow: myth, monstrosity, and nineteenth-century writing. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Lancaster, Ashley. â€Å"From Frankenstein’s Monster to Lester Ballard: The Evolving Gothic Monster.† The Midwest Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 2, 2008, pp.132-148. â€Å"Monster.† Oxford English Dictionary. Accessed online at www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/121738.Shelley, Mary. Frankenstein. 2nd ed. New York: WW Norton Co, 2011.

Essay examples --

How is morality defined? I never really grasped a straight forward definition of morality given by the speaker. Morality to me is a person’s code of conduct that they live their life by. It is a person’s beliefs that make them feel if something is right or wrong. What are the three interpretations of the hypothesis that morality evolved? The first interpretation of the hypothesis that morality has evolved is that some components of our moral sense evolved. This hypothesis is the least controversial of the three interpretations. This is because it is the only one that has any real sort of evidence that I can see. That evidence comes in the form of phylogenetic evidence. Scientists have been able to determine the primates exhibit some of the same emotions that humans have. Dr. Machery specifically reference a setting where one primate had more desirable food than the other and envy or jealously was exhibited by the primate with the less desirable food. This evidence means that emotions were passed down from a common ancestor before humans evolved. The second interpretation... Essay examples -- How is morality defined? I never really grasped a straight forward definition of morality given by the speaker. Morality to me is a person’s code of conduct that they live their life by. It is a person’s beliefs that make them feel if something is right or wrong. What are the three interpretations of the hypothesis that morality evolved? The first interpretation of the hypothesis that morality has evolved is that some components of our moral sense evolved. This hypothesis is the least controversial of the three interpretations. This is because it is the only one that has any real sort of evidence that I can see. That evidence comes in the form of phylogenetic evidence. Scientists have been able to determine the primates exhibit some of the same emotions that humans have. Dr. Machery specifically reference a setting where one primate had more desirable food than the other and envy or jealously was exhibited by the primate with the less desirable food. This evidence means that emotions were passed down from a common ancestor before humans evolved. The second interpretation...

Ibn Sina/Avicenna

‘Ibn Sina’s renown brought him the title ‘the leading eminent scholar’ (al-Shayk al Ra’is). Discuss the significance of his philosophical ideas with special focus on his distinction between his essence and existence, and its role in his proof for God as the necessary existent. Ibn Sina, or Avicenna, born 980 AD, was a leading polymath of many subjects; many of his theories are still renowned today; 240 of (approximately) 450 works can authentically be attributed to him, contributing to mainly medicine and philosophy, but also astronomy, physics, psychology, geology and even poetry. A devout Muslim and child prodigy, he had memorised the Qur’an by the age of ten, and quickly surpassed his teachers of the Hanafi Sunni school, and by the age of 16 was fully learned in the sciences of his time.After studying medicine, he turned his attention to physics and metaphysics, reading Aristotle’s Metaphysics forty times, until he had memorised it, y et he could not grasp its meaning until reading al-Farabi’s commentary which enlightened his problems of understanding. He began writing his own discourse on this topic and many others on his travels to Isfahan whilst working as a physician to Kings and other important figures, gaining prestige in medical matters and his knowledge of philosophy, theology and metaphysics was widely recognised.Even after his death in 1038 AD, his works have continued to influence philosophical and medical thought; his ‘canon of medicine’ served as the highest medical authority for 600 years, and the translation of kitab al-Shifa (Book of Healing) into Latin served as the starting point for many other prestigious thinkers, such as Aquinas, and this discourse will be further looked at here.Avicenna is considered â€Å"the most famous and influential of the philosopher-scientists of the Islamic world† There are many other Islamic philosophers that have attempted to address meta physics, but Ibn Sina’s works alone systematically and consistently focus on both ontological and cosmological arguments that are not self-contradictory and address the underlying issue of reconciling the Islamic faith with philosophy. â€Å"Before Avicenna, falsafa (Arabic Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy) and kalam (Islamic doctrinal theology) were distinct strands of thought, even though a good deal of cross-fertilization took place between them.After Avicenna, by contrast, the two strands fused together and post-Avicennan kalam emerged as a truly Islamic philosophy, a synthesis of Avicenna’s metaphysics and Muslim doctrine. † This is the primary reason for his lasting prestige; his ideas in the Book of Healing concentrated not on medicine, but on the healing of the soul and body, and held two key fundamental ideas; the distinction between essence and existence, and God as the necessary existent, a doctrine that has previously not been merged successfu lly.The doctrine of a ‘thing’ (shay’) proved difficult to define for the Mu’tazilis, as although they differentiated that a ‘thing’ can either be existent or non-existent; they struggled to define where the non-existent entities lay. Using the Qur’anic verse of creation: â€Å"our statement to a thing, when we wish it [to be], consist merely in our saying â€Å"Be! † and then it is. † (The Holy Qur'an 16:40), we can identify that something can exist in mentality before it exists in actuality; God thought of a ‘thing’ then willed it into being by saying â€Å"be! and it was. This shows that the idea of the ‘thing’ existed before its reality, meaning that the Mu’tazilis were able to conceive of the ‘thingness’ of contingent entities, and their universality (of thingness) can either exist in reality or in mentality. They could not address the idea of non-existent things, (ma†™dum) such as a square circle, as their impossibility cannot even exist in the mind. This idea opposes the Sunni theological perspective, where they hold that ‘thingness’ and existence are one and the same.They hold the idea of co-extensiveness (where all things are existents, and all existents are things) as they believe that this idea solves the problem of creatio ex nihilo; they did not want to give any flexibility to the idea that things existed before creation, or held eternality alongside God. They held that a ‘thing’ was the sum of all its predicates, one of which was existence; a thing could not be without it existing. However, this poses problems for the existence of things that can only occur in the mind, for example, a unicorn.There is a split in Sunni philosophy where some believe that a thing can either be considered as extra-mentally existent, (and so exist just as much as they would in actuality) or some believe a thing that only exists in the mind simply does not exist whatsoever. This is problematic, as we can all conceive of a unicorn, despite its non-reality, (therefore it cannot simply not exist at all), yet we cannot think of a unicorn existing in the mind on the same level as our own existence. Ibn Sina draws upon al-Farabi’s identification that ‘thing’ and ‘existence’ cannot be used as the same copula; you cannot ubstitute ‘thing’ for ‘exists’ in a sentence in a way that can make sense; for example, one can easily identify that the statement ‘Zayd exists as a man’ to be appropriate, but one cannot say ‘Zayd thing as a man’, as it is nonsensical. Therefore, Ibn Sina concludes that there is a distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘existence’, and also makes the distinction between existents and non-existents. For Avicenna, â€Å"there are four kinds of scientific questions. 1) One is a question about the â⠂¬Ëœexistence’ or ‘non-existence’ of things. 2) Another is about the ‘whatness’ of things. 3) And another is about the ‘whichness or ‘thatness’ of things. ) Also, there is the question about the ‘cause’ of things. † His distinction between essence and existence not only addresses the problem of the Sunni theologians, but, in his mind, satisfies what a ‘thing’ is, and that its ‘existence’ is not a predicate of thingness, and this argument can prove the existence of God as necessary. For Ibn Sina, existence adds to an essence specific determination external to the essence of a thing; existence adds to essence, an essence can be without existing, for example, the demonstration of the unicorn; its essence is separate from its existence as we can conceive of it without its actuality.He further explains this with categorising the necessary (wajib) and the possible/contingent (mumkir). Avicenna makes three distinctions: concrete existent, a mental existent and that which is neither of these two. A concrete existent is that which adds existence to its essence: that is to say that it, as an essence, also has existence. A mental existent is that which has essence, but not existence (such as a unicorn – it has essence because we can think of it).That which is neither is that which is logically impossible to exist even in the mind, such as a square circle; as it is impossible to conceive of such a thing, this does not even have essence. This solves the problem faced by Sunni philosophers, as it highlights the difference between mental essences without existence and concrete essences with existence. Avicenna continues to demonstrate three further aspects of essences: necessary, possible or impossible. Those that are impossible are those that it is illogical to think about, such as square circles, and as we have already shown, these do not have essence OR existence.That w hich is necessary is so because it’s very essence implies existence; its denial would involve a contradiction, (which we will further explain later). The possible is that which has essence that has potential to exist; it can either exist, or not exist. This is what contingent beings are categorised as; they have the potentiality to exist, through the cause of another; it cannot exist through itself, as otherwise it would be necessary, and it cannot not exist, as otherwise it would be impossible. Once actualised (through another), concrete existence is added to the essence.Avicenna would argue that mental essences are not concrete existents because they have not been brought into existence by another, so remain as potential essences that could exist, but do not in actuality. So far then, it has been demonstrated that Ibn Sina made the distinction of essences between that which cannot exist, that what can exist if brought into being by another, and that which exists through its own definition of its essence. When a possible essence is actualised through another, and becomes a concrete existent, it becomes ‘necessary through another’ – it must be caused by a cause external to itself.This in turn, must also be caused by another previous external cause, and so on. However, these causes cannot continue ad infinitum- there must be an external cause that itself is not caused by any other being external to itself, that is to say, that the cause is contained within itself, what Avicenna calls necessary through itself. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes, but must be one cause that can sustain and contain all possible causes, but itself need not be caused, as its essence itself contains existence, the Necessary Existent; God.So then, we have tackled the question previously posed of the existence or non-existence of things, what they are (possible/necessary), and the ‘thatness’ (whether it is necessary through another or i tself) – in turn answering the fourth question set out by Ibn Sina of the cause of things. Proof of God’s existence from this argument stems from the cosmological argument; an idea from Aristotle that there must be a First Cause in order to bring about the causes that cause others.However, Ibn Sina improves this argument by recognising that what something is differs from the fact that it is. â€Å"Ibn Sina’s way of making his point is to say that esse [fact of a things existence] is an accidental property of things – that is a quality it may or may not possess, without changing what it is†¦Ã¢â‚¬  Previously, philosophers such as Aristotle had only considered the nature of things, rather than setting them apart from their physical realisation. The distinction Avicenna makes between physical and mental existence is one that Aristotle had trouble in combatting. The most important text of this kind is Avicenna’s al-Shifa? ’ (The Healing, namely from ignorance). The title was wrongly (but aptly) translated into Latin as Sufficientia, as if Avicenna’s single comprehensive work was a sufficient replacement for the several books of Aristotle† This distinction was so important that every philosopher after Ibn Sina had to respond; the question was now apparent that there must be primacy of either essence or existence, as he had distinguished that they were not one and the same.Debate has followed Ibn Sina’s argument, that has mainly taken two paths; Suhrawardi decides that essence is prior to existence, whereas Ibn Arabi believes that only existence is real and essences are how existence presents itself to us. Thus, it has been demonstrated that Ibn Sina was successful in using an argument from reason that signifies God as the one creator, First to cause others, from which we could not possibly exist if it were not for His necessary existence through Himself.This was so profound for his time, as it had only been remarked that there previously lay a difference between the necessary and possible. Avicenna’s distinction between ‘through itself’ and ‘through another’ led to the reconciliation of Islamic thought and philosophical reason; there lies no contradiction between our own existence as concrete and God’s existence as wholly other, beyond our conception of contingent.This argument was so influential on both later thinkers due to his ability to draw upon early philosophical ideas and his faith brought together Aristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophy and Islamic theology in a way that made the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge; logically acknowledging that the first cause as a necessary existent can only be a monotheistic God, as all predicates, including that of existence are perfectly contained within the very definition of His essence.This theory is reconcilable with Islamic thought as it signals disenchantment wit h neo-Platonic thought, developing a more personal philosophy that argues for our own necessary existence (through another), whilst still acknowledging that God is unattainably necessary through Himself. â€Å"[Ibn Sina] envisaged a world resting on two pillars: a) Greek philosophy and b) Qu’ranic revelation and the virtues of man†¦Ibn Sina was a highly spiritual and ethical person, considering that, for him, teaching and learning should lead also to rooting in faith deeply in the soul of the individual. This meant that each individual had meaning for their own life, which they could relate back to God, personally having their own cause rooted in the Divine Necessary Existent. Bibliography * Avicenna ; Farhang Zabeeh, ( Ed. Trans. ) Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic: Part One of Danesh-Name Alai (a Concise Philosophical Encyclopaedia and autobiography) (Martinus Nijoff, the Hague, 1971) * Charles Burnett, â€Å"Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy in to Western Europe† in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy, ed.Peter Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) * F. C. Bauerschmidt, Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (Michigan, Brazos Press, 2005) * Robert Wisnovsky, â€Å"Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition† in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) * Sebastian Gunther, â€Å"Be Masters in That You Teach and Continue to Learn: Medieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational theory† in Comparative Education Review, Vol. 0, No. 3, (August 2006) Article DOI: 10. 1086/503881 Web Resources: * Encyclop? dia Britannica Online, s. v. â€Å"Avicenna,† accessed December 11, 2011, http://www. britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/45755/Avicenna * http://quran. com/ accessed 15/12/11 —————————— ————– [ 1 ]. Encyclop? dia Britannica Online, s. v. â€Å"Avicenna,† accessed December 11, 2011, http://www. britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/45755/Avicenna. [ 2 ]. Robert Wisnovsky, â€Å"Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition† in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed.Peter Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) p. 92 [ 3 ]. The Holy Qur’an 16:40 as cited from http://quran. com/16/40 (Sahih International Translation) accessed on 15/12/11 [ 4 ]. Robert Wisnovsky, â€Å"Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition† in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy pp. 106-107 [ 5 ]. Avicenna & Farhang Zabeeh (Ed. Trans. ) Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic Part One of Danesh-Name Alai (a Concise PhilosophicalEncyclopaedia and autobiography) (Martinus Nijoff, the Hague, 1971) p. 5 [ 6 ]. F. C. Bauerschmidt, Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (Michigan, B razos Press, 2005) p. 57 [ 7 ]. Charles Burnett, â€Å"Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe† in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy, p. 371 [ 8 ]. Sebastian Gunther, â€Å"Be Masters in That You Teach and Continue to Learn: Medieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational theory† in Comparative Education Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, (August 2006) pp. 376 – 377 Article DOI: 10. 1086/503881

The Great Gatsby By F. Scott Fitzgerald And Othello

By definition the term corruption is the â€Å"dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery† according to the oxford dictionary. There are many forms of corruption and many ways of corrupting an individual, more often than not the actions at hand may be considered illegal however there are still a multitude of legally corrupted things in this world. In each of the works in question corruption plays a major role in the advancement and continuation of the plot as well as the evolution and detailing of the characters. Both The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald and Othello by William Shakespeare part the common theme of corruption. As a means to justify such a claim, the theme of reputation, the significance of†¦show more content†¦Gatsby is what you want him to be and has done whatever your imagination would like you to believe he has done. On the other hand, In Shakespeare’s Othello, Othello is the plays protagonist and general of Venetian army. Reputation pushes him to value how the other characters see him; his concern for his public portrayal leaves him very vulnerable to manipulation. Here is where Iago comes into effect; he is a very intelligent, manipulative and psychopathic male character seeking revenge on Othello for having snubbed him for lieutenancy. Iago. Ha! I like not that. Othello. What dost thou say? Iago. Nothing, my lord; or if—I know not what. Othello. Was not that Cassio parted from my wife? Iago. Cassio, my lord! No, sure, I cannot think it That he would steal away so guilty like, Seeing you coming. Othello. I do believe twas he. (3.3.37-44) Iago drops subtle hints that he knows of an affair between Desdemona, Othello’s wife, and Cassio, his lieutenant, but after being asked about the topic he follows on denying it and codling Othello so as to stay on his good side. Thus he corrupts Othello’s mind with simple play. An equally significant aspect of corruption in The Great Gatsby and Othello is the role and contributing factor that money brings forth. In Fitzgerald’s novel, the story’s one of the central themes is wealth and the power that it brings to the wealthy. Most characters in The